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Domestic Decisions and Foreign Fragility: Injuries 




Early in 2014, the United States Congress approved legislation to allow 
the Peace Corps Commemorative Foundation to create a monument in 
Washington D.C. honoring fallen Peace Corps volunteers who died while 
in service.1 Since the creation of the Peace Corps in 1961,2 306 volunteers 
have died while serving in countries around the world.3 The notable 
absence of this kind of information regarding volunteer safety was the 
focal point of a 2011 lawsuit brought against the Peace Corps by two 
former volunteers, Charles Ludlam and Paula Hirschoff.4 According to 
their complaint, the Peace Corps did not provide adequate information 
regarding volunteer safety statistics.5 
The Peace Corps prides itself on sending volunteers to far-flung and 
remote locations, often where other NGOs and aid organizations do not 
bother to send staff.6 As a result, in countries like Sierra Leone, for 
 
*  J.D. Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (2018). 
1. About PCCF, PEACECORPSDESIGN.NET (Oct. 11, 2016, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.peacecorpsdesign.net/about/. 
2. President Kennedy established the Peace Corps with an executive order early in his presidency. 
Exec. Order No. 10,924, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,789 (Mar. 1, 1961). The idea for the Peace Corps emerged 
originally in a speech given at the University of Michigan, while Kennedy was still campaigning for 
the presidency. The Founding Moment, PEACECORPS.GOV (Feb. 5, 2017, 4:13PM), 
https://www.peacecorps.gov/about/history/founding-moment/. 
3. Fallen PCVs, FALLEN PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS MEMORIAL PROJECT (Oct. 11, 2016, 10:06 
AM), http://fpcv.org/fallen-pcvs/. 
4. Lisa Rein, Former Volunteers Sue Peace Corps, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/former-volunteers-sue-peace-
corps/2011/03/23/gIQAHh3AvJ_blog.html. 
5. As quoted in Rein’s article, the complaint stated that “[i]f the Peace Corps does not provide 
relevant information that enables the applicant to assess the quality of the program, the applicant 
should consider carefully whether or not to accept the invitation to serve . . .. Applicants are being 
asked to spend two years of their lives as volunteers, so the least the agency can do is provide full 
transparency about the Peace Corps.” Id. The typical Peace Corps term of service is two years long and 
the agency sends volunteers to countries around the world. Peace Corps Two-Year Program, 
PEACECORPS.GOV (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.peacecorps.gov/volunteer/is-peace-corps-right-for-
me/two-year-program/. 
6. Volunteers have served in more than 140 countries since 1961, and currently there are almost 
7,000 volunteers spread across 63 countries around the world. Fast Facts, PEACECORPS.GOV (Oct. 11, 
2016), https://www.peacecorps.gov/news/fast-facts/.  
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example, volunteers are often almost entirely reliant on the agency and its 
in-country infrastructure for medical care, safety and security information, 
and support.7 Even for returned volunteers, adequate medical care for 
injury or illness that occurred during service is difficult to obtain.8 Officers 
in the Foreign Service, government aid organizations, or American 
embassies are frequently in similar positions of reliance on the United 
States government for healthcare and support.  
With such control over the health and safety of its volunteers and 
officers, one might expect the government to be liable for its duty of care 
where a breach of that duty caused harm.9 Of course, the government’s 
failure to observe its duty of care has and does occur from time to time: for 
example, the death of volunteer Nicholas Castle in 2014 was described by 
The New York Times as “a trail of medical missteps.”10 In 2015, CBS 
 
7. See, e.g., Sierra Leone: Health, PEACECORPS.GOV (Feb. 5, 2017), 
https://www.peacecorps.gov/sierra-leone/preparing-to-volunteer/health/. The Peace Corps provides 
volunteers with “all necessary vaccinations, medications, and information to stay healthy.” Id. A full-
time medical officer works at each Peace Corps country post and is responsible for the medical care 
and health of volunteers during service, in addition to sending volunteers prescription medication. Id. 
8. Excerpts from RPCVs about Being Medically/Bureaucratically Displaced, Health Justice for 
Peace Corps Volunteers, http://healthjusticeforpeacecorpsvolunteers.org/historical_overview_2.html 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2017).  
9. Duties of affirmative action to prevent harm do, in some circumstances, exist and generally 
impose a duty of care where a special relationship exists. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). This note will assume that the government owes volunteers working 
abroad a reasonable duty of care with regard to their safety. The focus of the analysis will be on the 
ability to litigate that duty of care under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trail of Medical Missteps, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/world/asia/peace-corps-death-china-medical-missteps.html?_r=0. 
After Castle’s death, eighteen months passed without an official report from the Peace Corps about the 
cause. Id. In August of 2014, Castle’s family filed a federal tort lawsuit against the agency for 
“negligent, careless and reckless medical care and treatment provided to [Castle] by the United States 
Peace Corps and the acts and omissions of (the doctor who initially treated him).” Karen Rarey, 
Brentwood Couple Files Claim Over Son’s Death While Serving the Peace Corps, THE MERCURY 
NEWS (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/09/11/brentwood-couple-files-claim-over-
sons-death-while-serving-the-peace-corps/. A report on the death of Castle finally emerged, in which 
the Peace Corps’ inspector general found that “cascading delays and failures in the treatment” of Mr. 
Castle were a factor in the death, and that “the Peace Corps doctor . . . had failed to use prudent 
judgment.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Report Faults Care of Peace Corps Volunteer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/world/report-faults-care-of-peace-corps-volunteer.html; 
see also Kathy A. Buller, Office of Inspector General, Investigative Review of the Circumstances 
Surrounding the Death of a Volunteer in Peace Corps/China, PEACECORPS.GOV (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/PCIG_Investigative_Review_of_a_Volunteer_Dea
th_in_Peace_Corps_China.pdf. “The inspector general’s report . . . cites numerous medical lapses 
strongly suggesting that Mr. Castle’s death could in fact have been prevented, although it does not 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/16
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News obtained a report from the Peace Corps that found that about one in 
five volunteers reported they had been sexually assaulted during their 
service.11 The report was a follow-up to a 2011 report, finding that “Peace 
Corps’ safety and security failures have been a recurrent problem with 
tragic consequences for thousands of volunteers.”12 
Medical care for Peace Corps volunteers in particular has been the 
recent subject of tort litigation in federal court.13 In the 2016 case of 
Thompson v. Corps, pro se plaintiff-volunteer Sara Thompson brought suit 
against the Peace Corps for damages sustained as a result of the agency’s 
alleged negligent prescription of the anti-malarial drug mefloquine.14  
Thompson brought the claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA).15 The FTCA waives U.S. government sovereign immunity that 
would otherwise bar claims against the federal government in some 
circumstances.16 Thompson’s case, however, was dismissed without 
reaching the merits of her claim because of another FTCA provision, the 
“Foreign Country Exception.”17 The Exception bars any claim brought 
under the FTCA “arising in a foreign country.”18 Relying on a bright-line 
rule adopted by the Supreme Court in 2004,19 the court in Thompson 
determined that because the injury occurred in Burkina Faso, the 
 
explicitly blame the Peace Corps.” Stolberg, supra. The doctor responsible for Castle’s care had been 
vetted and hired through the Peace Corps’ national office in Washington, D.C. Id.  
11. Peace Corps Volunteers Blamed, Punished for Reporting Sexual Assault?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 30, 
2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-news-finds-peace-corps-volunteers-blamed-fired-after-
reporting-sexual-assault/. The report suggested systemic misconduct and mishandling of victims’ cases 
and their subsequent psychological and medical care. Id.  
12. Joshua Norman, Peace Corps Regrets Response to Rapes, Deaths, CBS NEWS (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/peace-corps-regrets-response-to-rapes-deaths/. 
13. Thompson v. Corps, 159 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2016). 
14. Id. at 57-58. The FDA issued a warning regarding the use of Mefloquine as an anti-malarial 
drug, which had been used extensively by the American military and the Department of Defense. Dr. 
Remington Nevin, Mefloquine: The Military’s Suicide Drug, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-remington-nevin/mefloquine-the-militarys-_b_3989034.html. 
According to Dr. Nevin, a former Army epidemiologist and preventative medicine officer, the drug “is 
neurotoxic and can cause lasting injury to the brainstem and emotional centers in the limbic system. As 
a result of its toxic effects, the drug is quickly becoming the ‘Agent Orange’ of this generation, linked 
to a growing list of lasting neurological and psychiatric problems including suicide.” Id.  
15. Thompson, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 60. 
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012).  
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2012) [Hereinafter Exception]. 
18. Id. 
19. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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government had not waived its sovereign immunity to such a claim, and it 
was therefore barred.20 Several similar cases have since been quickly 
dismissed relying on this bright-line rule regarding injuries that occur 
outside the territorial United States and its possessions.21 Instead, a 
volunteer’s path to medical care provided by the government for Peace 
Corps-related injury goes through the Department of Labor and, as a 
government task-force found, can take years or even decades to resolve.22 
This Note will address the court’s historical and contemporary 
interpretations of the Foreign Country Exception in light of the legislative 
intent of the FTCA and its case law. In sum, it will recommend an 
approach to the interpretation of the foreign-country exception of the 
FTCA similar to the approach taken by Justice Ginsburg’s concurring 
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.23 Part I addresses the background of 
common law sovereign immunity, and the legislative history of the FTCA 
and its foreign country exception. Part II examines federal cases that have 
developed a two-prong analysis of the Exception.24 It also revisits the 2004 
Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.25 Part III explores 
suits between private parties where injuries occurred abroad, and when 
United States courts have allowed such claims. Part IV argues that the 
 
20. Thompson, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 63.  
21. See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that a 
wrongful death claim by the family of a teenage boy, standing on the Mexican side of the border, who 
was shot and killed by a U.S. Border Patrol Agent, standing on the American side, was barred by the 
Exception), adhered to in part on reh'g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017); Gross v. United States, 771 
F.3d 10, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (a subcontractor’s claim against USAID for inadequate warning and 
training resulting in injury in Cuba was dismissed under the Exception); Ortega-Chavez v. United 
States, No. 11-CV-1507 BEN DHB, 2012 WL 5988844, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29 2012) (same holding 
as in Hernandez under almost identical circumstances); Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25-26 
(D.D.C. 2006) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) and barring a claim for injury in 
Guatemala caused by people working for the CIA), aff’d, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
22. Ex-Volunteers Accuse Peace Corps of Health Care Neglect, CBS NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/peace-corps-report-lack-of-health-care-medical-reimbursement-for-
returning-volunteers/. Many volunteers report being satisfied with medical care during and after their 
service, but some interviewed for the news story described the current method of making claims for 
medical care through the Department of Labor as a “heavy bureaucratic mess.” Id. 
23. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. concurring). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). See infra note 33, at 608-12. The analytical history of the exception began 
with cases focusing on the meaning of the words “foreign country,” in the Exception, while later cases 
shifted their focus to the meaning of “arising in.” Id.  
25. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/16
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bright line rule adopted by the majority in Sosa is ill-equipped to serve the 
purposes of the FTCA and the Exception. Finally, Part V proposes a 
broader tort analysis under the Exception that provides tort claimants a 
forum to make a case for causation under traditional tort doctrines. The 
Note concludes that the broader analysis proposed is more in line with the 
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the FTCA, and also with 
other federal cases where tortious injury outside the United States and its 
territories was permitted to move forward.26  
 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FTCA AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
Before the passage of the FTCA in 1946, claims against the United 
States government were resolved through congressional bill, a time-
consuming and unwieldy process.27 Such claims required legislative action 
because of the common law jurisprudential doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, which “provides that a sovereign state can be sued only to the 
extent that it has consented to be sued and that such consent can be given 
only by its legislative branch.”28 The FTCA does not itself create a cause 
of action against the government, however, it is merely a waiver of this 
common law immunity.29 
The operative provision waiving sovereign immunity under the FTCA, 
§ 1346, provides a United States district court with exclusive jurisdiction 
over all civil claims in which the United States is a defendant.30 The 
provision waives sovereign immunity “where the United States, if a 
 
26. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(holding that decisions to develop, use, and continue to use Agent Orange were made within the 
United States, and therefore the Exception was not a bar to injury claims).  
27. Although not a complete bar to claims arising from tortious conduct, before the FTCA citizens 
would have to petition congress for specific legislative relief associated with their injury or injuries. 
See generally Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L. J. 1105, 1107-08 (2009). Before passage of the FTCA in 1946, Congress 
was burdened with thousands of claim bills each session. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L. J. 
534, 535 (1947).   
28. Figley, supra note 27, at 1107. 
29. “The FTCA was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States 
from lawsuits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the government liable in tort as a 
private individual would be under like circumstances.” Thompson, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (quoting Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). 
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private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law 
of the place where the act or omission occurred.”31 There being no federal 
tort law, the act directs courts to look to the place where the “act or 
omission” occurred in order to determine the law that applies in any 
particular case.32 The FTCA thus served the purposes behind its 
enactment: that there be an increase in the government’s responsibility in 
tort in the interests of “justice and fair play”;33 that the FTCA render the 
government liable as a private individual would be;34 and that Congress be 
relieved of some of the burden of the thousands of claim bills brought 
before the legislature each session.35 
If sovereign immunity is a moat around the United States government 
protecting it from tort litigation, the FTCA is a drawbridge over which 
certain claims may pass.36 The Exception, which barred the claim in 
Thompson, bars some claims brought under the FTCA against the United 
States government.37 
The Foreign Country Exception states that the waiver of sovereign 
immunity described in § 1346(b) of the FTCA shall not apply to “any 
claim arising in a foreign country.”38 Congress included this limitation 
because without it, the Government might be subject to foreign law under 
§ 1346(b).39 Thus, courts have interpreted the purpose of this exception as 
congressional unwillingness to allow the United States to be subject to 
 
31. Id. 
32. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L. J., 534, 536 (1947).  
33. Kelly McCracken, Away from Justice and Fairness: The Foreign Country Exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603, 616 (1989) (quoting COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE 
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, Sovereign Immunity: 
The Tort Liability of Government and Its Officials 43 (1979)). 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this 
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” Id. 
35. See Figley, supra note 26, at 535; McCracken, supra note 33, at 606-07. 
36. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 n.10 (1979). The colorful metaphor described in this 
case is used here for its helpful illustration of the concept. 
37. See Thompson, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 63. 
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). 
39. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea spoke before Congress: “Since liability is to be 
determined by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims 
arising in this country. This seems desirable because the law of the particular State is being applied. 
Otherwise, it will lead I think to a good deal of difficulty.” See Tort Claims: Hearing on H.R. 5373 
and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 35 (1942) (statement of Francis M. 
Shea, Assistant Attorney General) [Hereinafter Hearings]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/16
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liability based on the laws of a foreign power.40 
 
II. CASES INTERPRETING THE FTCA’S FOREIGN COUNTRY 
EXCEPTION 
 
The meaning of the Exception in the statute has been the subject of 
several federal court cases involving tort claims brought by U.S. 
government aid workers and volunteers working abroad.41 Until recently, 
the analysis of this provision was largely in line with the overall 
congressional intent behind the passage of the FTCA in 1946,42 and with 
the intent of the Exception more specifically as found in past case law.43  
Interpretation of the statute in courts since passage in 1946 has focused 
on two questions: (1) what is a “foreign country” within the meaning of 
the statute,44 and (2) what actions or injuries constitute a tort claim 
“arising in” a foreign country?45 The Supreme Court first interpreted the 
 
40. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 762 
(D.C. Cir. 1979).  
41. See generally McCracken, supra note 33, at 608-10. See also Straneri v. United States, 77 F. 
Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (plaintiff could not recover for injuries caused by a negligently operated 
motorcycle by a member of the United States Army in Ghent, Belgium); Brunell v. United States, 77 
F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (plaintiff could not recover for injury suffered in Saipan because United 
States trusteeship of the island did not change its status as a foreign country); Meredith v. United 
States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964) (a claim arising out of injury on the grounds of the United States 
embassy in Bangkok, Thailand was barred because it arose in a foreign country). 
42. See McCracken, supra note 33, at 612-13. McCracken’s article calls for an expansive use of the 
“Headquarters Doctrine,” a concept this note will address below. This doctrine previously allowed 
suits to move forward in spite of the Exception, even though the injury complained of occurred in a 
foreign country. The Headquarters Doctrine was the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in ruling that the 
plaintiff’s claim in Sosa was not barred by the Exception. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
692 (2004); see also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 638 (9th Cir. 2003). The 
Headquarters Doctrine was explicitly abrogated by the Supreme Court in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692-93.  
43. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221. 
44. See id. (holding the land leased by the U.S. in Newfoundland met the definition of “foreign 
country”); United States v. Meredith, 330 F.2d 9, 10-11 (1964) (holding that injury at an American 
embassy in Thailand was in a “foreign country”); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (1948) 
(holding that “foreign country” is any area that is not “a component part or political subdivision of the 
United States”); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 4 (1932) (involving the court’s 
interpretation of the meaning of “foreign country” within the meaning of the internal revenue code). 
45. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the negligent acts of 
Navy air-traffic controllers which occurred within the United States, and which merely had their 
operative effect in Antarctica, were not acts which arose in a foreign country, and thus were not barred 
by the Exception);); Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding the Plaintiff 
failed to show a causal nexus between the alleged negligent acts from which the claim arose, and the 
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foreign country exception in United States v. Spelar,46 considering only 
the first question: the meaning of “foreign country” in the statute.  
 
A. The Meaning of “Foreign Country” in § 2680(k) 
 
In Spelar, a widow brought a claim against the United States 
government for negligent operation of Harmon Field, which she alleged 
caused the wrongful death of her husband, a Navy pilot, in a plane crash.47 
The claim implicated the Exception because Harmon Field was located in 
Newfoundland, and the land for the airfield was under a ninety-nine year 
lease to the United States from Great Britain.48 The Spelar Court did not 
analyze the meaning of the “arising in” language of the statute as that was 
not in dispute, but instead decided the case solely on the question of what 
Congress meant by “foreign country” within the statute.49 The Court 
analyzed the legislative history of the FTCA and held that the amended 
foreign country exception in its final form in the FTCA shows that 
“[Congress] was unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities 
depending upon the laws of a foreign power.”50 Therefore, because the 
widow’s claim would be “premised entirely upon Newfoundland’s law,” it 
must be barred by the foreign country exception.51  
Although the decision was unanimous, Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence is notable because he criticizes the majority’s holding as 
focused only on defining “foreign country” too simply and mechanically, 
and lacking further inquiry into the underlying issue of sovereignty and 
 
actual injury occurring in Germany); and Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(holding that allegations that a government agency committed negligent acts in the United States 
“were sufficient to raise reasonable questions about agency and proximate cause.”).). 
46. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).  
47. Id. at 218. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 219. 
50. Id. at 221. Congressional hearings on the FTCA included discussion of an earlier version of the 
exception. Hearings in 1942 by the House Committee on the Judiciary discussed a draft of the bill that 
barred claims “arising in a foreign country in [sic] behalf of an alien” (emphasis added). See H.R. 
5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., s 303 (12). Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea recommended the 
removal of the last five words saying, “[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from 
this bill, H.R. 6463, whether or not the claimant is an alien.” Id. at 29, 35, 66. The Justice 
Department’s revised version was H.R. 5373, and was adopted into law by 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
51. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/16
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United States control of the location of the injury: “[A] ‘foreign country’ 
in which the United States has no territorial control does not bear the same 
relation to the United States as a ‘foreign country’ in which the United 
States does have the territorial control that it has in the air base in 
Newfoundland.”52 Justice Frankfurter cautioned that, “[t]o assume that 
terms like ‘foreign country’ and ‘possessions’ are self-defining, not at all 
involving a choice of judicial judgment, is mechanical jurisprudence at its 
best.”53 However, he agreed with the majority that the Exception covered 
the claim and therefore sovereign immunity in this instance had not been 
waived.54 
 
B. The Meaning of “Arising In” in § 2680(k) 
 
The broad interpretation of “foreign country” found by the Spelar court 
continued to bar claims arising outside the United States and its 
possessions.55 However, using the Spelar Court’s analysis, the D.C. 
Circuit Court held in 1985 that a claim for an injury that occurred in 
Antarctica was not barred.56 In Beattie v. United States, plaintiffs sought 
relief under a wrongful death claim.57 The plaintiffs in Beattie sought 
 
52. Id. at 223 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In drawing this distinction, Justice Frankfurter compares 
what he sees as the mutable meanings of “foreign country” and “possession of the United States” with 
the immutable meanings the majority seems to give each of these concepts. Id. Justice Frankfurter 
would not so categorically demarcate a “foreign country,” where the FTCA would be inapplicable, 
from a United States “possession,” where it would be applicable, based solely upon the terminology 
used to describe the situs of the omission. Id. at 224.  
53. Id. at 223.  
54. Id. at 224. Justice Frankfurter strikes a note of caution on account of the court’s decision 
interpreting the term “possessions” in the Fair Labor Standards Act in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 
finding that in the context of that act, “possession” included a military base in Bermuda. Vermilya 
Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390 (1948).  
55. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10-11 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that claims arising on 
the grounds of a United States embassy in Thailand were likewise in the category of those arising in a 
“foreign country” and were therefore barred); Straneri v. United States 77 F. Supp. 240, 241 (E.D. Pa. 
1948) (holding that “foreign country” meant “all lands other than those for which [Congress] is the 
supreme legislative body. That is . . . the tort must have been committed on lands within the 
boundaries of the United States or its territories and possessions.”).  
56. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
57. Id. at 92. Plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of United States Navy Air Traffic Controllers at 
McMurdo Naval Air Station in Antarctica caused the crash of an Air New Zealand plane in 1979, 
killing all passengers on board. After the government filed a motion to dismiss, the D.C. Circuit held 
that Antarctica was not a “foreign country” within the meaning of the statute, and therefore denied the 
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recovery under the FTCA for the deaths of family members in an airplane 
crash allegedly caused by air-traffic controller negligence at McMurdo 
Naval Air State in Antarctica.58 Citing In Re Agent Orange Product 
Liability Litigation,59 the Beattie court found that “[those cases] support[] 
the proposition that § 2680(k) [i.e. the Exception] is not a bar to 
jurisdiction over cases arising at least in part outside the United States, and 
in areas where there is no theoretical justification for application of foreign 
law.”60 Thus, injury that occurs in places outside the United States and its 
possessions is not necessarily a bar to a valid tort claim, so long as 
proximate causation between domestic negligence and foreign injury can 
be adequately alleged by the plaintiff.61 
The Beattie court summarized a series of earlier federal cases and began 
to shift the analysis of § 2680(k) away from the exact meaning of “foreign 
country,” instead labeling earlier cases interpreting § 2680(k) as the 
“operative effect” cases.62 The Beattie court found that:  
These operative effect cases related “not so much the definition of 
‘foreign country,’ but to the meaning of ‘arising in.’ They determine that 
‘arising in’ does not necessarily refer to the situs of the injury, but to the 
situs of the negligence. The operative effect cases support subject matter 
jurisdiction over a portion of the plaintiffs’ claims in this case, those which 
have been characterized as the ‘headquarters claims.’”63  
 
government’s motion. Id. 
58. Id.  
59. 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984); see also In re Agent 
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Litigation was ultimately settled 
between the chemical companies and the individual tort claimants. See Procedural History of the 
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 335, 339 (1986). Various appeals and 
cross-appeals challenged the adequacy of the settlement in the following years, but after the United 
States ceased to be a defendant, the issue of the FTCA and the Exception was not raised again during 
the litigation. Id. at 340. 
60. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1985). (“Agent Orange, like the present 
case, involved an undetermined mix of acts or omissions, some occurring within the United States and 
others in a distant land, all contributing to the harm complained of.”).  
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 96. 
63. Id. (emphasis added). The Beattie court refers to Sami v. United States, in which an Afghani 
economist was falsely arrested by German police, in Germany, under the orders of a United States 
official. The court in Sami found that because “the instructions to make the arrest and most of the 
operative facts in Sami occurred in the District of Columbia, this Court determined that § 2680(k) was 
not a bar, because the case actually arose in the United States.” Id. (analyzing Sami, 617 F.2d 755 
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).  
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The court in Beattie would find grounds for relief by examining the 
claim under what would later become known as the “Headquarters 
Doctrine.”64 This reasoning mirrors Supreme Court and federal circuit 
choice-of-law decisions holding that the applicable state tort law to be 
applied under the FTCA for multistate tort claims is the jurisdiction where 
the negligent act or omission took place, not necessarily where that act or 
omission had its “operative effect.”65 The rationale for allowing 
Headquarters Doctrine claims was that the scheme of the FTCA generally 
was focused on the location of the wrongful act or omission,66 not the 
place of the injury.67 
 
C. A Return to ‘Foreign Country’ Analysis and the Decline of the 
Headquarters Doctrine 
 
Beattie was narrowly abrogated by a 1993 Supreme Court decision, 
Smith v. United States, deciding that Antarctica was a “foreign country” 
within the meaning of the Exception.68 Considering a similar fact pattern 
to the situation in Beattie,69 the Supreme Court narrowly held that not 
defining Antarctica as a foreign country under the FTCA would lead to an 
absurd result when combined with § 1346(b) of the FTCA, because that 
 
64. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 98; compare Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), with 
Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that “a headquarters claim 
exists where negligent acts in the United States proximately cause harm in a foreign country.”).  
65. See generally 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Tort Claims Act § 74; see also Richards v. United States, 
369 U.S. 1, 10 (1962) (holding in a domestic, multistate tort action that the FTCA directs courts to 
look first to the place where the negligence took place, not where the negligence had its operative 
effect); Gould Elecs., Inc. v.  United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3rd Cir. 2000); Hitchcock v. United 
States, 665 F.2d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Raflo v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2001).  
66. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2012); Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(allowing a headquarters claim for a negligently planned DEA investigation in Mexico); Eaglin v. 
United States, 794 F.2d 981, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1986) (dismissing a slip-and-fall claim on a military base 
in West Germany finding that the plaintiff failed to allege “a plausible proximate nexus or connection 
between act or omissions in the United States and the resulting damage or injury in a foreign 
country”); and Sami, 617 F.2d at 761 (finding that the entire statutory scheme of the FTCA focuses on 
where a negligent act or omission occurred and thus negligent acts in the United States that cause 
foreign harm are not barred by the Exception). 
67. Sami, 617 F.2d at 762 n.7. 
68. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).  
69. Id. 
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provision directs courts to look to the place where the act or omission 
occurred in order to determine the choice of law for the tort claim.70 If 
Antarctica were not a “foreign country” within the meaning of § 2680(k) 
such that the FTCA applied to a claim arising therein, then 1346(b) would 
direct courts to look to Antarctic tort law to resolve the case, which 
obviously does not exist and where it is notoriously difficult to get a court 
date.71 This absurdity ruled out such an interpretation for the Court in 
Smith.72 The Smith Court did not specifically address where the claim 
arose with regard to the negligent act or omission.73 
The analysis in Smith did not discuss the Exception’s legislative purpose 
to keep the United States from being subject to a foreign power’s tort law. 
Instead, the Court was more concerned with the fact that the FTCA 
directed courts to look to sovereignless places without any formal law 
whatsoever.74 In a prescient dissent in Smith, Justice Stevens highlighted 
the problem the Court’s broad construction of the Exception’s language 
might pose for these sovereignless places, especially in outer space.75 
 
70. Smith, 507 U.S. at 201-02.  
71. Id.  
72. Id. The court further explained its conclusion noting that there is a presumption against the 
FTCA being applied extraterritorially. Id. at 197. As noted by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, 
however, the FTCA has been held to be applicable extraterritorially in cases involving injury on the 
high seas. Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
73. Id. at 199 (majority opinion). The plaintiff’s husband died after falling down a crevasse while 
hiking near McMurdo station in Antarctica: “Petitioner filed this wrongful-death action against the 
United States under the FTCA in the District Court for the District of Oregon, the district where she 
resides. Petitioner alleged that the United States was negligent in failing to provide adequate warning 
of the dangers posed by crevasses in areas beyond the marked paths. It is undisputed that petitioner's 
claim is based exclusively on acts or omissions occurring in Antarctica.” Id.  
74. Id. at 201-02. 
75. Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In an article examining the issue of the FTCA’s coverage of 
outer space, the author notes, “the courts' regular and express application of the FTCA to the 
sovereignless region of the high seas between the time it was enacted and 1960, when the SIA was 
amended to provide an exclusive but comparable remedy, undermines any suggestion that the Act 
should not be applied extraterritorially.” Lauren S. B. Bornemann, This Is Ground Control to Major 
Tom…Your Wife Would Like to Sue But There’s Nothing We Can Do…The Unlikelihood That the 
FTCA Waives Sovereign Immunity for Torts Committed By United States Employees in Outer Space: A 
Call for Preemptive Legislation, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 517, 529 (1998); see also Smith, 507 U.S. at 207 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that the FTCA provisions at issue did not “identif[y] any territorial 
limit on the coverage of the Act”); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1960) 
(liability under the FTCA for death resulting from negligent rescue efforts on the high seas), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961); Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1960)(“In 
the same manner as a private person is liable under the Death on the High Seas Act, so, too, is the 
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Indeed, American law has often found it necessary to use its own law in 
such circumstances, or even, as Justice Holmes found in American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., when local law is inadequate.76 Injury in outer 
space caused by government negligence has not often been the subject of 
litigation, but the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and the Shuttle 
Columbia disaster in 2003 were unfortunate examples of injured parties 
without means of redress through the FTCA.77 In his dissent, Justice 
Stevens expressly rejected the government’s argument that the FTCA and 
the Exception should be interpreted as having “an exclusive domestic 
focus that applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”78  
The relatively narrow holding in Smith, that the FTCA did not apply to 
such sovereignless anomalies as Antarctica, allowed the survival of claims 
that grew out of the Beattie and Agent Orange line of cases under the 
Headquarters Doctrine.79 Under that doctrine, a plaintiff who could 
 
Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act”), aff'd, 306 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1962); Roberts v. United 
States, 498 F.2d 520, 525–26 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that FTCA waived sovereign immunity for claims 
under the general maritime law). 
76. 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909). In his opinion, Holmes stated, “no doubt in regions subject to no 
sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such 
[civilized nations] may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law, and 
keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive.” Id.; see also Old Dominion S.S. Co. 
v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1907) (holding that a Delaware wrongful death statute applied 
where injury occurred on the high seas because both parties were incorporated in Delaware and “the 
bare fact of the parties being outside the territory, in a place belonging to no other sovereign, would 
not limit the authority of the state”). American criminal law has also been held to apply 
extraterritorially. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933) (finding that the language of 
the criminal statute meant that “an American vessel outside the jurisdiction of a state ‘within the 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States’; is broad enough to include crimes in the 
territorial waters of a foreign sovereignty.”). 
77. Adam Liptak, Loss of the Shuttle: The Courts; No Legal Precedent Is Seen Should Columbia 
Families Choose to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/06/us/loss-
shuttle-courts-no-legal-precedent-seen-should-columbia-families-choose-sue.html. Four families of 
astronauts killed on the Shuttle Challenger reportedly settled their case for $750,000. Ronald J. 
Ostrow, 4 Challenger Families Get Settlement: Each Will Receive At Least $750,000; Thiokol to Pay 
60%, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-30/news/mn-1303_1_morton-
thiokol. Families of Shuttle Columbia astronauts reached a similar settlement in 2004 worth $26.6 
million. Jim Leusner, $26.6 Million Paid to Families of Seven Killed, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 15, 
2007), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-04-15/news/0704140183_1_kalpana-chawla-settlement-
details-astronauts. 
78. Smith, 507 U.S. at 206-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
79. See supra note 33, at 612. 
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properly allege that negligent acts or omissions occurring in the United 
States proximately caused his or her injury thereby stated a claim for relief 
under the FTCA, even if the injury actually occurred in a foreign 
country.80 However, this more flexible doctrine—allowing claims to go 
forward on pleadings that could show a substantial causal connection to a 
breach of the government’s duty of care in a U.S. jurisdiction—ceased in 
2004.81  
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court adopted a bright-line 
rule stating that the “foreign country” exception to waiver of government’s 
immunity “bars all claims against [the] government based on any injury 
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or 
omission giving rise to that injury occurred.”82 With such a bright-line rule 
in place, the district court needed only brief analysis of the plaintiff’s 
claim in Thompson to find that the foreign country exemption barred the 
Peace Corps volunteer’s claim against the agency, which arose from an 
injury suffered while serving in Burkina Faso.83 Thus, the bifurcation of 
claims by the Exception—those adequately alleging domestic negligence 
and foreign injury being allowed, and other claims alleging both foreign 
negligence and foreign injury being barred—ended with Sosa. This bright-
line rule has since been followed by federal circuit courts.84  
Going forward, the bright-line rule will continue to deny the claims of 
Peace Corps volunteers, and similarly situated U.S. government aid 
 
80. Id.  
81. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703 (2004). 
82. Id. at 712. In Sosa, a Mexican national, who had been acquitted in a United States court of the 
murder of a DEA agent in Mexico, sued the government for violation of his civil rights as a result of 
his capture and extradition to the United States for trial. Interestingly, the Eastern District of California 
declined to follow the decision in dicta on the Supreme Court’s finding in this case regarding the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS), but the ATS is beyond the scope of this note. Id. Justice Ginsburg, while 
concurring in the judgment in Sosa, would have issued a narrower holding, while still expressly 
rejecting the Headquarters Doctrine used in earlier federal cases interpreting § 2680(k). Id. at 751 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence embraces earlier Supreme 
Court rulings on the FTCA and the applicable jurisdiction to a given claim based on the location of the 
negligence from which the injury arose. See id. 
83. 159 F. Supp. 3d at 63. The court did not analyze any of Thompson’s substantive negligence 
claims, but instead decided the claim solely on the place of injury. Id. A related claim by Thompson 
under the Peace Corps Act was also dismissed. Id.  
84. See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2014) adhered to in part on 
reh'g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. 
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).  
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workers abroad, and will prevent them from being able to seek recovery 
under the FTCA regardless of whether the negligence causing the injury 





D. Suits Between Private Parties Where Injury Occurred in a Foreign 
Country 
 
The FTCA makes the government liable “where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law 
of the place where the act or omission occurred.”85 In suits between private 
parties, where the United States is not a defendant, plaintiffs are permitted 
to demonstrate a substantial connection between an alleged tortious act in 
a United States jurisdiction and injury occurring abroad for purposes of 
determining the propriety of venue.86  
 In Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge Training Center, a suit by 
families of victims killed by Blackwater security staff survived a motion to 
dismiss and were permitted to conduct additional discovery and amend 
their complaint in order to show sufficient causal connection between the 
injury suffered in Iraq and negligent acts by the security contractor in the 
United States.87 Thus, the plaintiffs suing a non-government defendant 
were granted a forum for further discovery of tortious conduct within 
United States that, on a systemic level, may have given rise to their injury 
in Iraq.88 
 
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). 
86. See Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2009). 
Families of civilians killed by Blackwater security contractors in Iraq brought tort action in federal 
court against the private security firm for injuries and death that occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. Id. at 3-5. 
87. Id. at 12. In finding that dismissal of their claim was inappropriate, the court suggested that 
“when determining whether a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiff’s 
claim occurred or did not occur in a particular district . . . the facts that courts focus on include the 
place where the allegedly tortious actions occurred and the place where the harms were felt.” Id. at 8 
(quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, The Fallback Provision, 14D FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3806.1 (4th ed.)). 
88. Estate of Abtan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 11. The court found, “it is entirely proper for this court to 
hear the plaintiffs’ claims so long as they bear a substantial connection to the District of Columbia. [] 
It is unclear, however, from the plaintiffs’ pleadings and memoranda of law whether such a connection 
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E. Suits Against Private Parties and the United States Government, the 
Agent Orange Litigation 
 
Similarly, Vietnam War veterans, alongside their families, were allowed 
to bring negligence claims against chemical companies and the United 
States government for the use of Agent Orange during the war.89 Both the 
claims against the United States and the United States-based chemical 
companies survived motions to dismiss, and the court found that the 
Exception was not a bar because it was “undisputed that the initial 
decision to use Agent Orange, the decision to continue using it, and 
decisions relating to the specifications for Agent Orange were made in this 
country.”90 Although the court does not use the term “Headquarters 
Doctrine,” the court analyzes the government’s use of Agent Orange in 
light of the “operative effect” cases cited by Beattie91 in finding that the 
government’s allegedly negligent decision-making and planning occurred 
in the United States.92 After the initial finding that the Exception was not a 
 
exists in these cases. The Court would therefore be well within its discretion to simply grant the 
defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer and relieve itself of further consideration of this matter. But if 
the plaintiffs had formally requested venue discovery on the issue of the defendants' purported written 
submissions transmitted to this jurisdiction at the outset of the case, they may well have satisfied the 
Court's concerns about the ambiguity of their assertions. To penalize the plaintiffs for this failure on 
their part would unduly elevate the formal requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over 
the substantive merits of the plaintiffs' position.” Id. 
89. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). There, Agent 
Orange was a defoliant used by the United States Army to try and reduce the jungle canopy in 
Vietnam, making it easier to detect enemy soldiers from the air. Id. Agent Orange is a dioxin and 
plaintiffs alleged it caused various physical injuries, including cancer, in those exposed to the 
chemical. Dioxin (Agent Orange, Dowcide 7)—Military Use of Agent Orange, AM. L. PROD LIAB. 3d § 
110:33 (2016). 
90. In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. at 1255.  
91. 756 F.2d 91, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
92. In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 580 F.Supp. at 1254. The claims against the chemical 
companies were ultimately settled, and third-party claims of wives and children of the soldiers against 
the United States government were dismissed under Feres/Stencel doctrine, another exception to the 
FTCA outside the scope of this note. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 782 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Procedural History of the Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 52 BROOK. L. REV. 335, 
339 (1986). The Feres-Stencel doctrine bars claims of military service members and their families for 
injuries incident to that military service. In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 770. 
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bar to the claims against the government in In re Agent Orange, the court 
did not again consider that question in its ultimate dismissal of claims 
against the United States on other grounds.93 
 Thus, before Sosa’s bright-line rule, federal courts were willing to 
consider tort claims against private parties and the United States 
government as claims that arose within the United States because of 
negligent decision-making here at home. Using a consistent analytical 
approach to determine whether a claim arises domestically or abroad, 
regardless of whether a claim is against a private party or the government, 
would allow Peace Corps volunteers to recover for negligent domestic 




With the holding in Sosa and the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
Headquarters Doctrine, litigants that can convincingly trace their foreign 
injury to a negligent act by the government in a United States jurisdiction 
are denied a forum for claims under the FTCA, and thereby relief, solely 
because that injury occurred outside United States.94 This strictly territorial 
approach to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is at odds with the 
legislative intent of the Exception and the Act more generally,95 and is also 
at odds with existing case law involving non-governmental tortfeasors.96 I 
believe the note of caution sounded in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in 
Spelar97 foreshadowed this later difficulty in interpreting the Exception, 
where injuries occur outside the United States, but the FTCA could and 
should allow such suits to go forward. 
In his majority opinion in Sosa, Justice Souter noted that the Supreme 
 
93. Id. at 782. 
94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 693 (2004). 
95. See generally supra note 41. 
96. See generally supra note 75, at 528. 
97. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 223 (1949). The reader will recall that Justice Frankfurter 
warned against assuming “that terms like ‘foreign country’ and ‘possessions’ are self-defining, not at 
all involving a choice of judicial judgment,” because such assumptions would be “mechanical 
jurisprudence at its best.” Id. Such mechanical jurisprudence should likewise be avoided in 
determining the extraterritorial application of suits where injury occurs in a foreign country, but the act 
or omission giving rise to that injury occurred in the United States.  
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Court’s holding in Richards98 observed that “the general conflict-of-laws 
rule, followed by a vast majority of the States, is to apply the law of the 
place of injury to the substantive rights of the parties”99—even though that 
approach was ultimately contrary to the Court’s holding in Richards. 
Thus, under the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, in the case of 
bodily injury, the choice of law is to be “the place where the harmful force 
takes effect on the body.”100 In the case of injury occurring in a foreign 
country, this necessarily would invoke foreign law and go against the 
expressed legislative intent of keeping the United States from being 
beholden to the law of a foreign sovereign.101  
However, that interpretation of choice of law doctrine is not universal in 
American tort law.102 Other states depart from the more general conflict-
of-laws rule by “tak[ing] into the interests of the State having significant 
contact with the parties in the litigation,” in order to apply the tort law of 
the state where the act or omission occurred.103 Ultimately, Richards 
advocates for the more flexible view of the FTCA to allow for States that 
depart from the general rule, “where its application might appear 
inappropriate or inequitable.”104 In a multistate tort action, the Richards 
court rejected the defendant’s assertion that “Congress intended the words 
‘act or omission’ to refer to the place where the negligence had its 
operative effect,”105 and instead concluded that Congress  “enacted a rule 
which requires federal courts, in multistate tort actions, to look in the first 
instance to the law of the place where the acts of negligence took 
 
98. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962). 
99. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 704. 
100. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377, note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
Interestingly, the hypothetical situation posed in the Restatement is the exact situation that arose in 
Hernandez. 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014). In the hypothetical, X shoots Y where each is standing on 
the opposite side of the border between two states. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
377, supra. In Hernandez the tortfeasor and the victim were standing on opposite sides of the border 
between the United States and Mexico. 757 F.3d at 255. 
101. See generally Tort Claims: Hearing on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 35 (1942) (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General).  
102. Richards, 369 U.S. at 11-12. The Court goes on to observe that some states have moved away 
from the territorial rigidity of choosing applicable law based on where tortious harm affects the body. 
Id. at 12. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 13.  
105. Id. at 10. Where the act or omission has its “operative effect” is synonymous with the place of 
injury. Id. 
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place.”106 Thus the Supreme Court previously interpreted the FTCA to 
allow claims that arise in jurisdictions where the act or omission occurred, 
and not simply where the injury occurred. The Second Restatement 
suggests courts look to the “state which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship to the occurrence.”107 Thus, this could be 
either the state where the injury occurred or where the negligence 
occurred. Furthermore, in multi-state tort actions like that in Richards, it 
would allow the court to consolidate various cases under one umbrella-
case addressing the negligent behavior of defendants in one jurisdiction.  
The holding in Sosa contradicts this analysis under Richards by directing 
courts to look only to where the injury occurred, with no consideration 
given to the place of the negligent act or omission.108 
Government employees and volunteers working abroad may face a 
significant obstacle in finding tort relief against the government, which in 
turn may contribute to negligent decision-making and planning on a 
systemic level within government agencies like the Peace Corps.109 Under 
the current interpretation of the Exception, when negligent policies cause 
injury abroad, those policies would be shielded from claims under the 
FTCA and robust American tort law would be unable to reach the 
negligent acts that caused the injury in the first instance.  
The bright-line rule adopted by the majority in Sosa is discordant with 
past decisions interpreting the FTCA110 and its choice-of-law provisions.111 
It is also a harsh and inequitable interpretation that, while protecting the 
United States from being subject to foreign law as Congress explicitly 
intended,112 fails to render the government liable in tort as a private 
individual would be under like circumstances.113 Such private parties have 
been liable in tort, even where injury occurred abroad, in the case of In re 
 
106. Id. 
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (AM. LAW. INST. 1988).  
108. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (“[w]e therefore hold that the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all 
claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or 
omission occurred”). 
109. See supra note 10.  
110. Richards, 369 U.S. at 10-13. 
111. Id.  
112. Tort Claims: Hearing on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 77th 
Cong., 35 (1942) (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General) 
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
Washington University Open Scholarship










338 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:319 
 
 
Estate of Abtan114 and even where plaintiffs sued private parties and the 
government under the same cause of action as in the Agent Orange 
litigation.115  
The strict territoriality in Sosa has barred claims that bring the inequity 
of such an interpretation of the Exception into focus. In Hernandez v. 
United States,116 a fifteen-year-old boy was shot and killed while playing 
on the Mexican side of the border by a United States Border Patrol Agent 
standing on the United States side.117 Even though the court in Richards 
would have directed the analysis to where the act or omission causing the 
injury occurred (i.e. the firing of the gun), the Fifth Circuit relied on Sosa 
to bar the claim stating that “at all relevant times, Hernandez was standing 
in Mexico. Any claim will therefore necessarily be based on an injury 
suffered in a foreign country.”118 Thus the difference between an allowable 
claim under the FTCA and that claim being barred is not the application of 
foreign law of the United States, as intended by Congress in adopting the 
Exception,119 but is instead only a physically territorial distinction. If the 
Hernandez case were interpreted in light of the holding in Richards, there 
would be no need to consider Mexican tort law at all since the negligent 




Government workers and volunteers abroad may be more vulnerable to 
negligent acts or omissions committed by the United States than citizens 
living stateside because of their substantial reliance on medical and 
security services provided by the government.121 Regarding the sexual 
 
114. Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2009). 
115. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
116. 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), adhered to in part on reh'g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (hearing at the 
Supreme Court was limited to Bivens issues and the border agent’s qualified immunity).  
117. Id. at 255. 
118. Id. at 258. 
119. Hearings, 77th Cong., 35 (1942) (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General) 
120. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962). The holding in Richards was limited to 
multistate tort actions, but I believe the analysis works equally well in the case of cross-border or 
foreign injury allegations, which I propose below. 
121. See supra note 10.  
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assault of Peace Corps volunteers in 2011,122 the Government 
Accountability Office found that “some volunteer leaders who assist in 
site selection and volunteer monitoring and who act as contact points in 
the event of an emergency do not receive adequate training and are not 
prepared to discharge their safety-related duties.”123 Similar complaints 
have been leveled at the Peace Corps regarding medical care.124 These 
government reports critical of the Peace Corps and its handling of 
volunteer deaths or injury have often been slow to emerge.125 Such 
systemic issues contributing to harm abroad could be more readily and 
adequately addressed through robust tort litigation for claims where injury 
occurs in a foreign country. Such a system would properly give 
compensation to victims, settle disputes as to the legal rights of victims, 
and properly punish wrongdoers in order to deter such negligent decision-
making in the future.126 
Private individuals have previously been the subject of litigation where 
injury occurs abroad but where negligent acts or omissions occurred 
within the United States.127 As in the Estate of Abtan and Agent Orange 
cases, claims adequately alleging negligent acts or omissions in the United 
States were permitted to move forward. Such an approach to suits under 
the FTCA should involve a similar analysis. Doing so would bring to light 
the kinds of systemic issues complained of in agencies like the Peace 
 
122. Laura Strickler, Where Are Peace Corps Volunteers Most At Risk of Sexual Assault?, CBS 
NEWS (May 11, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-are-peace-corps-volunteers-most-at-
risk-of-sexual-assault/; Tim Mak, Whistleblower: Peace Corps Ignored and Then Blamed Sexual 
Assault Victims, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/30/whistleblower-peace-corps-ignored-and-then-
blamed-sexual-assault-victims.html. 
123. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-02-818, Peace Corps: Initiatives for Addressing 
Safety and Security Challenges Hold Promise, But Progress Should be Addressed 23 (2002). The 
report, authored in 2002, was critical of Peace Corps administrative training for volunteer leaders who, 
the report found, were serving with no or inadequate training regarding volunteer safety. Significant 
media focus on this issue did not emerge until nine years later in 2011. See Rein supra note 4. 
124. See supra note 22.  
125. See supra note 10. The report on the death of Peace Corps Volunteer Nick Castle was finally 
published almost two years after his death. Karen Rarey, Brentwood Couple Files Claim Over Son’s 
Death While Serving the Peace Corps, THE MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/09/11/brentwood-couple-files-claim-over-sons-death-while-
serving-the-peace-corps/. 
126. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
127. Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2009); 
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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Corps.128 It would also spur meaningful change within government 
agencies creating policies and procedures for their operations abroad. 
Analyzing cases under the FTCA in this manner would thus be more in 
line with the legislative intent of the FTCA,129 and of the Exception 
specifically,130 and it would also be more consistent with other federal 
court cases between private parties where the alleged injury occurred 
abroad but was caused by domestic acts or omissions.131 Such an 
interpretation would also be more in line with general tort principles such 
as compensation for victims and encouraging the exercise of due care.  
I propose that the court should move away from the rigidly territorial 
approach described in the bright-line ruling of Sosa and apply a “last 
significant omission” rule under 2680(k). This doctrine would allow the 
well-developed American tort concept of proximate causation to be the bar 
to tortious injury abroad caused by domestic negligence.132 Such an 
approach to claims under the FTCA need not subject the United States to 
foreign law. The last significant omission rule would still require that act 
or omission giving rise to the claim be within the United States in order to 
escape being barred by the Exception. Thus, claims resulting from foreign 
injury may still, in some circumstances, “arise in” the United States, as 
demonstrated in Hernandez. This approach both abrogates other holdings 
advocating the “Headquarters Doctrine,” addressing the Court’s concern 
that such a doctrine threatens to swallow the Exception whole,133 and this 
rule would also grant a forum for relief to citizens suffering injury abroad 
that was proximately caused by domestic government negligence.  
In the case of Thompson,134 facts were not alleged to show that the last 
significant omission occurred at Peace Corps in Washington, D.C., but 
 
128. See supra note 12. 
129. See McCracken, supra note 33, at 619. 
130. Tort Claims: Hearing on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 77th 
Cong., 35 (1942) (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General). 
131. See, e.g., Estate of Abtan, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1; In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 1242. 
132. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg advocates interpreting § 
2680(k) alongside the substantive provision of the FTCA, § 1346(b), finding “the choice-of-law 
regime of the jurisdiction in which the last significant act or omission occurred . . . has the salutary 
effect of avoiding the selection of a jurisdiction based on a completely incidental ‘last contact,’ while 
also avoiding the conjecture that alternative inquiries often entail.” Id. at 769-70 (quoting Simon v. 
United States, 31 F.3D 193, 204 (3rd Cir. 2003)). 
133. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 703. 
134. Thompson v. Corps, 159 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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under a Richards analysis, the plaintiff would at least be permitted to make 
her case that such a domestic act or omission caused her injury in Burkina 
Faso. According to one former Army Medical Officer, the widespread 
prescription of mefloquine is akin to the government’s use of Agent 
Orange in Vietnam.135 Similar cases could be filed for volunteers who 
were injured or have died abroad as a result of negligent acts or omissions 
that may be part of a systemic problem causing widespread harm.136  
Actions brought under the FTCA involving foreign injury should be 
read in light of Richards,137 especially with regard to Peace Corps 
volunteers whose health and safety abroad are often controlled by 
decisions made at the agency’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
Although the holding in Richards was limited to tort cases involving the 
conflict of laws between two states,138 its analysis that looks first to the 
place of the negligent act or omission should likewise be used in the case 
of foreign injury. If courts were to look first to the place of the last 
significant negligent act or omission, then plaintiffs adequately alleging 
that such acts proximately caused their injury would state a valid claim for 
relief. The government would thus be liable as a private individual would 
be under similar circumstances.139 Therefore, the congressional intent of 




 Government volunteers and aid workers are among the most important 
international ambassadors accomplishing meaningful work around the 
world,140 while also helping to educate people around the world about 
 
135. Nevin, supra note 14. Mefloquine, also known by its brand name, Lariam, received a “black-
box” warning label from the FDA in 2013. Katie Thomas, F.D.A. Strengthens Warnings on Lariam, an 
Anti-Malarial Drug, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/fda-
strengthens-warnings-on-lariam-anti-malaria-drug.html. Black box warnings are used with drugs with 
particularly severe side effects. Id.  
136. See supra note 10.  
137. Richards, 369 U.S. at 11. 
138. Id. (“We conclude that Congress has, in the Tort Claims Act, enacted a rule which requires 
federal courts, in multistate tort actions, to look in the first instance to the law of the place where the 
acts of negligence took place.”). 
139. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
140. See Peace Corps Accomplishments: 2001-2004, PEACECORPS.GOV (April 2005), 
http://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/accomplishments.pdf. The open letter introduces a 
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American values and culture.141 To help encourage Americans to 
participate in these important goals, the government should pledge itself to 
an adequate duty of care for those citizens who choose to participate in the 
effort. The FTCA should be allowed to render the government liable, as 
any private party would be, so the watchful eye of American tort law can 
provide relief to people injured by negligence abroad, and so that it can 
encourage the proper discharge of the government’s duty of care. 
The strictly territorial approach adopted in Sosa is at odds with previous 
interpretations of the FTCA involving multistate domestic claims,142 and is 
antithetical to the overall purposes of the FTCA.143 This approach fails to 
make the government liable as a private individual would be in like 
circumstances,144 and also frustrates the interests of justice and fair play 
for tort victims145 and past case law.146 Thus the court should refocus its 
analysis in foreign injury cases under the FTCA to the last significant act 
or omission causing the injury, allowing meritorious claims to find relief 
without subjecting the United States to foreign law.  
 
 
report of facts, figures, and anecdotes detailing the agency’s accomplishments during Vazquez’s 
tenure as Director of the Peace Corps. See id. at 7.   
141. Changing Lives the World Over, PEACECORPS.GOV (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://www.peacecorps.gov/about/. The Peace Corps’ three goals—to help (1) the people of interested 
countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, (2) promote a better understanding of 
Americans on the part of the peoples served, and (3) promote a better understanding of other peoples 
on the part of Americans—are a helpful illustration of the role these international aid agency’s can and 
do serve around the world. 
142. Richards, 369 U.S. at 11. 
143. See supra note 33, at 624-25.  
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.  
145. See supra note 33, at 616. 
146. Richards, 369 U.S. at 11. 
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